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De Sublimitate 30. 1: An Overlooked Pointer to a Date?
J. K. NEWMAN
In an article written twenty years ago, with characteristic boldness Professor
Georg Luck argued that this treatise should after all be attributed to Cassius
Longinus and dated to the third century A.D.^ His conclusions have not been
accepted by everyone,^ but perhaps a small pointer telling in favor of a later
date at least may be derived from c. 30. 1, where the author recommends f|
T&v K-opCcov Kal ^eyaA^onpETicbv ovo^dTcov iKkoyr\ as an aid to
sublimity. The text is cited from the edition of D. A. Russell (repr. Oxford
1970):
'E7iei6Ti n£vxoi Ti xo\) Xoyov votiok; ti xe <ppdCTi<; xd nXeico 5i'
CKaxepo-u 5i£Ttx\)Kxai, i9i Stj, [av] xoii cppaoxiKou \iipoMC, ti xiva
^iTtd exi, Jrpooe7ll6£aoco^£6a. oxi n£v xoivov ti xwv Kvpicov Kal
^EYaXo7Ip£K6c)v 6vo^dxcov ekXoyti Baunaaxox; dyEi Kal KaxaioiXEi
xovq dKovovxaq Kal (oc, jcdoi xoic; pTjxopai Kal ovYYPC^PEvai kox'
dxpov £jiixT|5£-o|ia, liEYEOoq d|i.a KdXXo(; EvnivEiav Pdpoq lox'uv
Kpdxo<;, Exi 5£ ydvcoolv xiva, xoiq X^oyok; ©oreEp dyd^iiaai
KaXX,iaToi(; 5i' avxfiq EJiavGEiv napaoKEud^ovoa, Kal oIoveI
V\)XT|v xiva zoic, Tcpdynaoi <p(ovTixiK-nv EvxiGEiaa, \ir[ Kal
TtEpixxov fi 7tp6(; EiSoxaq 5i£^i£vai. <pw(; ydp xw ovxi i5iov xor»
vov xd KoKa. 6v6)j.axa.
Since thought and expression are in general closely entwined, we may now
go on to consider any areas of the theory of language not yet covered. The
choice of impressive (K-opicov) and magnificent words has an amazing
effect, bewitching the audience. It is a supreme goal of all orators and
^ "Die Schrift vom Erhabenen und ihr Verfasser,"y4rc/oj 5 (1967), 97-1 13. Cf. on the later
dating G. M. A. Gnibe, "Notes on the OEPI Y^OYY,"American Journal of Philology 78
(1957). 335-74; idem, The Greek and Roman Critics (Toronto 1965). pp. 340-42. A statement
of the orthodox position about the date (first century a.d.) is made by John M. Crosseti and
James A. Arieti. The Dating of Longinus, Studia Classica III, University Park. Pennsylvania
(undated).
^ Giuseppe Martano, "D 'Saggio sul Sublime'," Airfstieg undNiedergang der romischen Welt
n. 32. 1 (1984). rejects Luck's thesis on p. 367. note 4. but concludes on p. 370: "Secondo noi.
la controversia [i.e. over the date of the work] rimane subjudice, e vi rimmara fino a quando
nuovi elementi di prova (per ora di assai ipotetica reperibilita) non interverranno a risolvere il
problema." It is just such an 'elemento di prova' that this essay hopes to furnish.
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historians. It produces grandeur, beauty, patina, weight, strength, force,
and over all these a brilliance that sheds a bloom on words as if they were
the fairest sculptures. It puts a speaking soul into things. But this is
something where my readers need no reminder. Beautiful words are indeed
thought's own illumination.
'Ovondxcov eK^oyn, the Latin delectus verborum, is an important task
for the stylist, and there were at least three kinds of style. Evidently here
the grand style is being recommended, and Kiapia and \izyaXonpzKr\ are
approximate synonyms for "impressive" or "magnificent."^ Although
sublimity is an effect and not a style, the author of the treatise does not
always keep that distinction well in mind. He is inclined to sympathize
with the doctrine prevailing among later Latin rhetoricians, and influential
throughout the Middle Ages, in Renaissance criticism and even beyond, that
grandeur demanded grand vocabulary. This confusion, which denies some of
his own better insights, explains why he returns to the topic at the end with
an attack on "low" words in c. 43, forgetting that what matters is the result
and not the means, as Shakespeare's mastery of the monosyllable proves.
All this has been amply documented elsewhere. Here it is enough to note
that neither the Virgil who employed communia verba in the Aeneid, nor
the Horace who employed unpoetische Worter in his odes nor Quintilian nor
Macrobius—nor eventually Dante—shared this view.'*
If he is ready to challenge these authorities, and to show that this would
result in a poetry superior to that of Virgil, Horace, Dante and Shakespeare,
of course "Longinus" is entititled to ask for "impressive and magnificent
words" (what Russell calls "Noble Diction") as his fourth source of
sublimity, and the concomitant avoidance of the vulgar; but what he is not
entitled to do is change the meaning without notice of a technical term of
rhetoric, where since the time of Aristotle 6v6|iata Kiapia had meant
precisely the opposite of "impressive words." *0v6|iaxa Kt)pia are not
unusual words employed for an effect of special beauty and force after careful
choice, as "Longinus'" ^leyaXoTipeTifi might suggest. They are the normal,
everyday words of ordinary vocabulary. This is why they enhance clarity
(Rhetoric 1404b5-8):
Twv 5' 6vo)xdTcov Ktti pimotxcov aacpfj [xev Ttoici xa K'opia . ^fj
xaneivfiv 6e dXXct KeKoa^Tiiievriv xaXka 6v6\iaTa ogg cvpiiTai
£V TOlt; TtEpl TIOlT^TlKTIt;.
It does not seem possible to translate icupCcov as referring merely to the "right" words
("'Auswahl' der passenden Worter," Luck, 1 10). Kvipia 6v6p.aTa are the right words because
they are commonplace, as AristoUe's Taneivfi Xi^ic, {Poet. 1458a lS-20, quoted below) makes
absolutely clear, and that is the opposite of what is being said by "Longinus". He is concerned
with KoKd ovonaxa
.
"^See my The Classical Epic Tradition (Madison, Wisconsin 1986), pp. 244 ff.
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Among nouns and verbs, those thai are normal produce clarity, while the
other words described in my Poetics produce an elevated and adorned style.^
The allusion to the Poetics is to the doctrine there of the "gloss," the rare or
archaic word that can transform a line {Poetics 1458al8-23):
Ae^eto(; Se dpefq aatpfj koi \ir\ xa%t\VT\\i ewai. oa<pe<jxdxTi |j.ev
ouv eaxiv t] ek tcov K-opicov 6vo^idT(ov aXka T^(?.n^\\r\-
jiapd6eiYHa 5e ti KXeocpavxoc; reolriaiq xal \\ iGeveXov. ae|ivTi 5e
Kai e^aXXdxxo-ooa x6 iSicoxiKov r\ loic, ^EviKoi(; KexpTmevir
^eviKov 5e Xeyw yXoixxav Kal |xexa(popdv Kai cTieKxaoiv Ka\ jcdv
x6 napot x6 Kvpiov.
The virtue of diction is to be clear without being flat. The greatest clarity
is got by using words in their normal meanings, but such diction is flat.
Examples are the poetry of Cleophon and Sthenelus. Diction that is
impressive and alters the ordinary style makes use of estranged vocabulary.
By "estranged" I mean the gloss, the metaphor, lengthening and everything
that departs from the ordinary.
Aristotle's Ki5pia ovoiiaxa are therefore exactly the reverse of the
impressive diction secured by "glosses," and therefore exactly the reverse of
what "Longinus" means by his use of icupia ovo^iata. It shows a certain
boldness to quarrel in this way with the master, and an even greater boldness
to stand his terminology on its head without explanation or apology.
The best commentaries are provided by poets and interaction with poets.
The treatise had last been edited by Franciscus Portus in 1570, and was first
translated into Italian in 1575 by Giovanni di Niccolo da Falgano. There is
evidence of some influence by it on practical criticism in Lorenzo
Giacomini's Oratione in lode di Torquato Tasso, recited to the Accademia
degli Alterati on March 20, 1595 and published in 1596, where we hear of
Tasso's excellence
ne la elezzione de le parole graui dolci aspre sonore splendide signo-
reggianti, e nel altezza e nel abondanza degli omamenti . . . con soUecito
studio procaccio a suoi poemi altezza efficacia e leggiadria eccellente, ma
non somma chiarezza; . .
.
in the choice of words that are weighty, charming, harsh, resonant,
brilliant, predominant, and in the sublimity and copiousness of his
refinements . . . with attentive enthusiasm he secured for his poems
sublimity, effect and extraordinary grace, although not utter clarity. . . . ^
The repeated altezza here already alerts us to the doctrine of x>\\foq, but,
in the same passage, Giacomini may also feel the ambiguity in Kvpioq to
' My emphasis, of course.
* Quoted by B. Weinberg, History ofLiterary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance (Chicago
1961), p. 1059, note 137. Since Weinberg calls Giacomini "an old-fashioned Alexandrian" he
evidently overlodcs the allusion to "Longinus".
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which reference has been made. He speaks of Tasso's "parole graui dolci
aspre sonore splendide signoreggianti." Weinberg follows a beaten track in
translating the climaxing last word as "overpowering": but it would be
possible to set up a series of antitheses: graui / dolci: aspre I sonore:
splendide I signoreggianti. In this case, splendide would refer to what
Aristotle would have called "glosses,"^ and signoreggianti (signore = Kdpioq:
cf. Horace's dominantia, below) to the opposite of this, "words in their
prevailing or normal connotations." Tasso certainly was in trouble with
some critics for using the latter,* though whether Giacomini wholly
understood the scope of his own argument is uncertain.
"Magnificent (overpowering) words" / "words in their normal
connotations"—what does ovoixaxa lojpia mean? It is clear what its Latin
equivalent meant for Horace in a well-known passage of the Ars Poetica
(234-39):
Non ego inomata et dominantia nomina solum
Verbaque, Pisones, Satyrorum scriptor amabo;
Nee sic enitar tragico differre colori,
Ut nihil intersit Davusne loquatur et audax
Pythias emuncto lucrata Simone talentum.
An custos famulusque del Silenus alumni.
When I write satyr plays, Pisones, I will not confine myself to plain and
ordinary words, or make such efforts to avoid the tragic manner that there is
no difference between the language of Davus the slave and pert Pythias
when she has conned Simo out of a fortune; or on the other side that of
Silenus, even though he is the warden and servant of a growing god.
Horace uses dominantia in the sense of Aristotle's ta K-opia (icupioq =
dominus). In-ornata coupled with it makes it quite clear that the poet
understands by dominantia words used in their "predominant," "prevailing"
and hence "ordinary" meanings. Ornatus (Koafioq, KaxaoKeDTi) is exactly
the reverse of this. Giacomini's eulogy of Tasso referred to the altezza e . .
.
abondanza degli ornamenti and, in a striking passage attesting the longevity
of these terms, E. R. Curtius^ quotes Dante, who in the Convivio (II. 12.
24) remarked that "e la bellezza neH'ornamento delle parole," and in the
Inferno (2. 67) praised Virgil's "parola omata." Curtius goes on to cite a
French textbook of 1787 (two years therefore before the Revolution) stating
that "le style de I'orateur et celui du poete a besoin d'etre orne." In his
remarks on the passage of Horace quoted, C. O. Brink ^^ notes an isolated
Lumina in Latin rfietorical vocabulary: verborum et senlentiarum ilia lumina quae vacant
Graeci <yir\\uxia, Cicero, Brutus 79. 275. Cicero's praise of Lucretius (muitis luminibus ingeni
[= oxTmaxa b\a\o{ac,\,ad Q.fr. 11. 10. 3 [Watt, OCT p. 69]) should be compared with
"Longinus"' cpccx; . . . tow vou quoted above.
*E. g. with L. Salviati (Weinberg, p. 1018): cf. C. P. Brand, Torquato Tasso (Cambridge
1965). pp. 121 ff.
^ Europdische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter (Bern 1948), p. 78.
^^ Horace onPoetry: The 'Ars Poetica' ('Cambridge 1971), p. 285.
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use of dominantia in Horace's sense even as late as the fifth century (the
medical writer Caelius Aurelianus).
But 6v6}j.axa icupia are for the de Sublimitate on a par with jxeya^o-
TTpeTcfi! This completely contradicts both Horace and the normal, Aristo-
telian meaning of the Greek phrase in rhetoric and grammar.^ ^ Even
Diogenes Laertius still has the normal sense (3rd century A.D.?), and of
course so does Horace's contemporary Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
sometimes suggested as the author of the work.
When did this change of meaning take place, and is it widespread? After
no example of this expression was found in the genuine Longinus,^^ a
search of the following texts for Kvpiov ovo|ia or its oblique cases in
"Longinus"' sense was conducted with the help of the Thesaurus Linguae
Graecae: ^^
(a) From corrected texts: Alexander rhetor; Anonyma in Aristotelis artem
rhetoricam commentaria; Anonymi rhetores; Apsines rhetor; Aelius
Aristides rhetor; Hermogenes rhetor; Libanius rhetor et sophista;
Polybius rhetor; Sopater rhetor; Syriani, Sopatri et Marcellini scholia ad
Hermogenis Status; Themistius philosophus et rhetor; Aelius Theon
rhetor.
(b) From uncorrected texts: Adrianus rhetor; Alexander rhetor Ephesius;
Aphareus rhetor; Aristobulus ludaeus philosophus; Demetrius rhetor;
Diodorus rhetor; Lesbonax rhetor; Philiscus rhetor; Polyaenus rhetor;
Timolaus rhetor.
Of these texts, only the Anonyma in Aristotelis artem rhetoricam
commentaria; Hermogenes; Sopater; and Syriani, Sopatri et Marcellini
scholia ad Hermogenis Status offered evidence of Kvpiov 6vo|ia or its cases:
\. Anonyma in Aristotelis artem rhetoricam commentaria (date unknown).
The numerical references are to the pages and lines of H. Rabe's edition of
Anonymi et Stephani in artem rhetoricam commentaria (Berlin 1896):
(a) Kupia ovofiaTa Xeyei xa(; vvpioX-e^iaq. (163. 34)
By Kvpia ovo^iaxa he means words used in their ordinary senses.
(b) Kvpia 6v6|i.aTa Xeyei tot xaxa KvpioXe^iav Xxx|J.pav6^£va• ek
TiapaXXfiXov 5e e^Pe to Kvpiov koI to oiKeiov ax; Ta-uTot ovTa.
(166. 19 ff.)
" See the entry in LSfi s. v. H. 5.
^^AoYy{vov TexvTi 'PtiTopixTi, \n Rhetores Graeci, ed. L. Spengel (Leipzig 1853), I. pp.
299-320.
^' Grateful thanks are due to Professor Theodore Brunner and his staff at Irvine for so readily
answering my query. Professor Brunner estimated from a preliminary survey that Kvpiot; might
occur about 57,000 times in the entire TLG dau bank. It was therefore necessary to make a
perhaps arbitrary selection in a preliminary study.
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He means by Kvpia 6v6|iaxa words used in their ordinary senses. He
takes ordinary and appropriate in the same sense.
(c) ormeiov 5e xo\> 5eiv ev zoiiq Jie^oiq X^oyoiq Kvpioiq ovo^aai
Xpao6ai, 5i6xi Jidvxeq o'l jiaXaiol ptixopeq xovxoiq xP^i^vxai-
Tidvxeq yctp 6iaX£Yovxai tixoi dX.X,riX.oi(; ovvoiiiXovoiv ev
^£xa<popiKOi^ 6v6|iaai xal ox> Kvpiovq. (166. 24 ff.)
A proof that it is necessary to use Kvpia ovo^axa in prose is their use by
all the old orators. <Nowadays> everyone converses or speaks with his
neighbor in metaphorical rather than ordinary language. ''^
(d) 6et)xepo(; 5£ xpono^ noicov oa<pr|veiav x6 xoiq iSioic; Kai
Kvpioic, 6v6^.aoiv cKaoxov 6vo)i.d^eiv xai ^.fi xoiq nepiixovaiv
•fixoi xov(; Ka9' oXcu, oiov xov IwKpdxiiv. (181. 12 ff.)
A second way to gain clarity is to use appropriate and ordinary names for
everything, and not periphrases or universals: for example, "Socrates."
(e) al |iEv ov)v yXmxxai rixoi al SidXcKXOi elolv dyvcoxeq tiM-iv xal
dyvooaxoi, xd 5e Kvpia ia|iEv 6v6|j.axa. (202. 15)
Glosses or dialectical usages are unknown to us and unfamiliar. Ordinary
words we know.
Five examples also occur where ovo|xa loipiov means "proper name."^^
2. Hermogenes (2nd-3rd century A. D), Flepl ibzoiv Xoyoi. Cf. Hermogenis
Opera, ed. H. Rabe (repr. Stuttgart 1969), 2, p. 5, line 80.
exepov hz zxhoc, 5pin\)xrixo(; x6 ek napovo|Aaaiaq, o\)k e^
6noi6xrixo(;, oxav Kvpi© xivi 6v6|iaxi r[ prmaxi xp^od^evoi eix'
e\)0\)q enonevoi xovxo) xpilo^oiieGa Kai ecp' oh \x.j\ Kvpiov eoxi
TipdyM-axcq.
A second type of sarcasm involves an unexpected play on words rather than
punning. We use a noun or verb in its normal sense, and then immediately
go on to apply it to something where it is not normal.
3. Sopater (4th century A.D.). Cf. Rhetores Graeci, ed. C. Walz (Stuttgart
1835, repr. 1968). Example (a) is from the Scholia ad Hermogenis Status
sen artem rhetoricam. Examples (b) and (c) are from the Aiaipeaeiq
ZTiTTmdxcov,
(a) XeYO|iev, 6xi ouSeitoxe 5vvaxai ovoxfivai dv9opian.6<; )iti
jipoTiYr|oa|ievov) opov 6 7ip(oxo(; ztiay\iivoc, x6 Kvpiov eaxe xov
6v6)j.ato(;, 6 5e £vavxiO(; ex xr\c^ evavxioxrixoi; £iXr|(p£ x6 ovoiia.
(Walz 5. 152. 27).
^* This seems to be the sense. Cf. itaque, si antiquum sermonem nostra comparemus, paene
iam quidquid loquimurfigure est. . . , Quint. /. 0. IX. 3. 1.
^^ This usage is attested since Polybius. See below.
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Our argument is that a counter-definition must always be preceded by a
definition. The first is drawn up to contain the normal use of the name: the
counter-definition gets its name from its contrariety.
(b) anb tov ToX,|ifmatO(; xo-bxov e'xei ti\v kXtioiv (xkoXo-oGov. wax'
ei TO 6vo|i.a ek xr\c, Jipd^eax; Kax' a-uxwv Kvpiov, xal ti ti)icopia
(letct xmv voiicov kot' avtcov Kvpia eivai 6<peiXei ctei. (Walz 8. 254.
22)
He takes his sobriquet from this reckless deed, so that, if a name is validly
applied to them that derives from their behavior, their legal punishment
also ought always to be vaUd.
(c) r\ napaypacpvKTi ev )j,ev exei x6 Kiopiov 6vo^a• cove^e-oKxai
5e Kttxd ev6\)5iK{av Ttdvxox; aXX,Ti xvv{, r[ \iia. xmv XoyiKoiv, t[ \im
XQv vo|i.iK£)v. (Walz 8. 267. 31)
A plea of inadmissibility has one normal name, but is of course combined
in relation to the direct plea with another depending on either a point of
logic or a point of law.
4. Syriani, Sopatri et Marcellini scholia ad Hermogenis Status ("post A.D.
saec. 7"). This is from Walz 4, page 400, lines 25-27:
epo\)|j.£v ovv, oxi lidXioxa nev xm koiv© 6v6|j.axi dx; iSiw
expT|<Jaxo- itoXka. ydp koi aXka x© xo\> yivoMq 6v6^axl one, Kvpico
KEXpTixai.
Our explanation will be that he has preferred to use the common name as
proper. There are many other cases of his use of the name of the genus as
if it were specific.
The meaning of icupvov 6vo|a.a as "proper name," is already noted in
LSP for Polybius (VI. 46. 10), Apollonius Dyscolus (2 c. A.D.) and
Herodian (2 c. A.D.). This is a variant of Aristotle's doctrine that the Kupiov
6vo|ia of anything is that by which it is normally known. The anonymous
commentary on the Rhetoric (1. above) shows both usages. All the texts
show that icupiov ovo^a is felt as something ordinary and appropriate
because it defines the prevailing usage of a particular word or term. In no
case is Kvpiov something so unusual or impressive that it could be an aid to
extraordinary or "sublime" effects. There is thus no parallel at all in the
texts scanned to "Longinus'" meaning. The nearest approach to that is
actually listed by LSJ^ s.v. K-opiox;. The adverb, which for Aristotle means
"in the normal sense," is used to mean "in a special or exceptional sense" by
Aristotle's commentator Olympiodorus in the 6th century A.D. But even
this is not really the same as "in a magnificent sense," \LzyaXoKpznG)c„
which would be needed for a complete parallel with de Sublimitate 30. 1.
How far "Longinus" is flying in the face of tradition is shown by his
own use at 28. 1 of tcupioXoyia to imply "words in their ordinary sense."
This meaning was hallowed by centuries of usage in the schools. Tryphon,
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for example, a rhetorician dated by Walz to the time of Augustus, shows
total orthodoxy:
TH^ 6e (ppdaecoq eiSii eial bvo, KupioX-oyia xe kov xponoq.
KvpioXoyta nev ovv eotiv ti 6ia tfii; npo)xr[C, Seoecoq tcov
6vo|idx(ov OTi|j.aivo-uaa- oiov. . . . (Tryphon, Flepi tpoTtcov, Walz 8.
728. 5 ff.)
There are two categories of expression, literal and figurative. Literal
language conveys its message by using the prime significance of words, for
example. . . .
The point is then illustrated by Homer, Iliad. XXIII. 634-37.^^
The term was used by the anonymous commentary on the Rhetoric and
other late authors in the form KvpioXe^ia. Here, the de Sublimitate agrees
with the rhetorical tradition as it still persisted in late antiquity, even in
Eustathius.^'' But two chapters later, as we saw, Kiapioq parallels
\iEyak(mpEnr\<;. Two questions arise:
a. What triggered in the author's mind an interference so powerful that he
reverses the normal meaning—normal even for himself—of the adjective
K-upioq in the phrase K-upia 6v6|j.ata? This meaning is still well
established both in Hermogenes and in the Anonyma in Aristotelis artem
rhetoricam commentaria (and for that matter almost to the end of
antiquity).
b. Can this interference, whatever its cause, have occurred as early as the
first century A.D.,^^ even in the reign of Augustus, as has been suggested
by those who assign the treatise to Dionysius of Halicamassus?
The answer to the second question is obviously no. How could a
professor of rhetoric publish a treatise which, without apology or
explanation, stands on its head the ordinary usage of a technical term of his
art as evidenced by contemporary rhetoricians both in Greek and Latin? If he
had been Dionysius of Halicamassus, this would be a technical term at that
which he had himself applied elsewhere in its usual sense. What would his
readers have made of it? Careful and comparative reading of the De
Sublimitate shows in fact that it heralds quite a different sensibility. In the
assessment of this, its anti-Alexandrianism must be noted. Can the critic
^^The treatise attributed to Gregory of Corinth Gate 12th, early 13th century) by Walz (8. pp.
763 ff.), where a similar definition and illustration of icupioXoYia occurs, is regarded by K.
Krumbacher, Geschichte der byzantinischen Lilteratur (repr. New Yoric 1970), I. p. 589, as
" KupioA-e^ia, 624. 41; vopioXeKTeoj, 623. 36; 836. 58. See Eustathii Commentarii ad
Homeri Iliadem, ed. M. van der Valk, 11 (Leiden 1976), "Praefatio," p. XUII with note 3.
^^ A. Lesky, for example, following (the unnamed) Wilamowitz, is quite sure that
"Longinus" answered Caecilius of Caleaae "in A.D. 40" {History ofGreek Literature, Eng. ir. p.
830).
J. K. Newman 151
who damns Apollonius with faint praise and Callimachus by indirection
have been the contemporary of Virgil, Crinagoras, or even Quintilian?
The answer to the first question is more complex. In the twelfth
century, Eustathius still maintains the distinction between xpoTioXeKxeco
and K\)pioX,eKtea). A contrary interference so powerful in the case of
"Longinus"—the more powerful the earlier he is dated—must be caused by
cross-cultural factors. Already Cicero speaks of certain verba as propria, as
certa quasi vocabula rerum, paene una nata cum rebus ipsis (de Or. III. 37.
149). The element of conventionality, urged in Plato's Cratylus by the
Parmenidean Hermogenes, is beginning to be attenuated by such a theory.
This feeling was reinforced by those cultures in which the yawning gap
between "word" and "reality" was less obvious than to the Greeks. The
Hebrew davar, for example, means both Xonfoc, and epyov, and K-opioq is the
normal equivalent of the Divine Name in the Septuagint. "The Word(s) of
the Lord" is a concept familiar to Jews and Christians in many senses except
that of "ordinary," "everyday," "normal." This is to enter on a vast field,^^
but in fact Jewish influence has often been noted in the treatise, apart from
the Genesis quotation (9. 9). For the Hebrew mind, the name or shem was
as closely related to the named thing as the shadow is to the body that casts
it.20
To theorists of this persuasion, the eKA-oyfi icopCcov ovo^idtcov could
not therefore be a simple matter of rhetorical effect. It was something more
primitive, less conventional and arbitrary, since the Kt)pia ovoiiaxa are not
so much rhetorical devices as clues to the essence of what is named,
conferred at the time of the invention of language. The Stoics had begun to
follow this line of thought,^' already familiar to Plato; and Philo Judaeus
(no rhetorician) provides an extraordinary example of such confusion of
Hebrew religious and Greek grammatical idiom. He praises the authors of
the Septuagint, for example, for the precision of their work (de Vita Mosis
II. 38):
Kauoi ziq ov)k oTSev, oxi naaa ^ev 5id>.eKTO(;, r\ 5' 'EXXiivikti
5ia<pep6vTC0(;, ovoiidxcov nXo-uxei, xaX xaiixov ev0'unT||i.a oiov xe
jxexacppd^ovxa Kai 7tapa<ppd^ovxa oximaxioai noXXaxSx^,
dXXoxe dXXac; e<pap)j.6^ovxa Xi^eiq; oTcep enl xa'6xii(; xr\q
vo^o9eota<; o\> <paoi ovjiPfivai, ovvevexOtivai 5' ei^ xavxov
" Of which the entiy s.v. "dabar" in Botterweck /Ringgren, Theologisches Worterbuch zum
Alten Testament, 11 (Stuttgart 1977), cols. 89-133 (Bergman, Lutzmann, Schmidt), gives some
inkling.
^See G. Kiltel, Lexikon zum Neuen Testament, V (Stuttgart 1950), pp. 242 ff., esp. pp.
263-64 (H. Bietenhanl); Bauer-Amdt-Gingrich, Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament
and other Early Christian Literature (Chicago / Cambridge, 8th impression 1964), p. 574, col.
2.
Cicero, de Off. 1. 7. 23.
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K^pia K'upioK; 6v6|iaai . xa 'EXXtivikoc zoic, XaXbdiKoic,, evapfio-
oGevta e\) |idXa toiq SriXovnevoK; npdyiiaai.
It is a commonplace that the Greek language is uniquely rich in vocabulary.
It is possible to translate and paraphrase the same thought in many forms
with the help of varying words. But in the case of this giving of the Law
that did not happen. The Greek and Hebrew were precisely correlated, exact
wordfor exact word, well adapted to the revelation given.
It might indeed be possible to translate icopia Kt)p(oi<; ovo^iaai here as
"inspired word for inspired word," something that for an Aristotelian would
never do.
Philo contrasts this precision with the lubricity of normal Greek, where
all kinds of adaptations of a single enthumema are possible. In another
passage {Quod del. potiori insid. soleat, Cohn-Wendland [Berlin 1886], I.
287. 26: cf. II. 95. 8) he speaks of eiKpavxiKcotdxcov Kal Kvpicov
6vo)idxcov, "most expressive and exact words." This collocation of
adjectives, with its graphic ("painterly") nuance, reminds one very much of
the de Sublimitate. Elsewhere in Philo lODpiov ovojia means, not the
"everyday name" of some object, but the "proper name" of the Lord. De
Mutatione Nominum 12 may be adduced:
5{5cooi KaxaxpfioGai iac, av ovojiaxi K-opico xa» "Kvpioq 6 0e6(;."
He permits the use, as if it were a proper name, of the phrase "the Lord
God."
Philo approves of those [Stoic] contemporaries whom he describes as
^TjXTjxiKol x(bv K-opCcov ovojidxcov ("scckcrs after the right names"). But,
if the KiSpiov ovo^a was the normal nomenclature of an object, why was
any search necessary?
It is one thing however to find that a name expresses the essence of a
created thing, and another that it is magnificent. But if God sanctioned the
names, then obviously they may share (like Moses) in His reflected glory.
Philo provides both the evidence of change from the Aristotelian meaning
for which we are looking, and the plus that is missing in the Stoic theory.
The de Praemiis el Poenis marks a culmination in his re-evaluation of
Kvpioq. On section 111 (TtayKaXtoq xpTlodfievoq loic^ 6v6|iaai icupioiq
a|xa Kal npoa<pt)£oiv: "making excellent use of the right and natural
names"), F. H. Colson^^ lists some of Philo's varying usages of Kvpiov
6vop.a23 and continues (my italics):
Here the use is extended further. "Day" is Kvpiov because it expresses the
lesson which Philo draws more exactly than "years" for instance would, and
"number" is Kupiov because it brings out a similar lesson more exactly
^ Loeb Qassical Library, vol. Vm (London and Cambridge, Mass. 1939), p. 457.
^ Which may be studied in detail in J. Leisegang's indices in vol. Vn of Cohn-Wendland, pp.
582-83.
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than "a// thy days" would. Thus the phrase [i.e. Kvpvov ovo^a] has been
made to mean something almost the opposite ofwhat we should call literal
Is not this nayKaXdic, the root of "Longinus"' own wrench (in Formalist
terminology, sdvig) of ovoixaxa loipia towards ^zyaXonpEnr\ in the de
Sublimitatet
It is evident that with Philo we move into a different world from that of
Horace's inornata et dominantia nomina, even though the two were, roughly
speaking, contemporaries. But, as Colson's note shows, for Philo this
reversal of meaning was by no means established. His thought was still
shifting and fluid. He was still engaged in arguing a case. He certainly lays
the groundwork for the change of meaning found in the de Sublimitate but,
one suspects, no more than that. He was after all a speculative thinker and
philosopher, not a rhetorical technician. He was far too conscious of his
Jewish heritage to be so absorbed by the Greek literary achievement.
By the time the de Sublimitate was written by one who evidently was a
professional student of hterature of any kind, and who accords no privileged
status to an Old Testament example paralleled with one from the Iliad, the
traditional meaning of the phrase Kt>pia ovoiiaxa, sanctioned by the
authority of Aristotle, hallowed by centuries of rhetorical teaching, and
presumed by Philo's polemic against Greek glibness, must have begun, in
certain quarters at least, to fade. Now it could mean the word that pened*ated
to the very heart of the thing named, that gave as it were the Creator's
perspective, "putting a speaking soul (vvxt] (p(ovT|tiKTi) into things."
Bereshith (2. 7) related that God had breathed into Adam the breath of life,
and that he thus became a "living soul," nepesh hajjah, in the Septuagint
\j/\)XTi C^oa. But, in "Longinus", where the sublime artist with words
becomes himself a kind of creator, bringing the bloom of life to his
sculptures.^"* \fMxy\ (ptovritiKTi also seems a loaded expression, and the
unexpected use of nepesh on the Qumran scrolls to mean "throat as the
organ of speech" (= "speaking soul") may be dimly at work in the
phraseology of the Greek.^ Philo had commended Moses' modesty as an
orator, but made God answer him {De Vita Mosis I. 84):
^The imagery is already known to Pindar. Cf. Nem. 5. 1 ff., and J. K. Newman / F. S.
Newman, Pindar's An (Hddesh&im 1984), pp. 114-18.
^Nepesh normally denotes in Hebrew the throat as breathing, or as eating, hungering,
desiring, rather than speaking. But "My nepesh (= "throat" = yuxri ) roars so as to praise Thy
name" is quoted from the Qumran finds (llQPsal9. 8) in Botterweck-Ringgren-Fabry,
Theologisches Worterbuch zum Allen Testament V (1986), col. 553 (H. Seebass). Seebass adds
that the verb here is appropriate to a lion (cf. Pindar's ©puaai, 01. 9. 109, with which LSJ^
compare LXX Ps. 37 [38]: 9). He also notes expressions from the scrolls such as "With my
whole leb and my whole nepesh I bless / glorify TTiee."
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otpa ye oiYvoEiq, Eine, tov 66vxa ctvGpwnq) ax6\ia vai Kaxa-
OKEvdoavxa y^'ii't'tav koI dpiTipiav kuI xf|v dnaoav X-oyiKriq
(pcovfiq opycxvonoiiav; avxoq el|i.i iydt.
Do you not know, he said, the One who gave to man a mouth, and who
formed the tongue and throat and all the instrumentality of rational
discourse? It is I Myself.
The notion of the "speaking soul" seems very close to this.^^
A Hellenized Jew in Philo's tradition would understand that a \\fvxr[
(pcovTiTiKTi fresh from praising the Name of the Lord Most High (to ovo^ia
KvpCoD -uvi/faTo-o) and now imitating His creative act in words could not use
in its sublime task Aristotle's kind of ovo^axa xrupia. MeYa>,07tpe7ifi
would alone be appropriate, since the Lord alone is great, and that is what
KTupia would now have to mean. The implicit theory of artistic creativity
reminds one of Pygmalion, most familiar from Ovid's Metamorphoses,
although even he neeeded the help of Aphrodite. Orthodox Jewish unease
with the idol and even with the golem, which had no cpcov-ri, may be
contrasted.^"^
The author of the de Sublimitate was not the genuine Longinus, since
in the passage compared by Luck^* with de Subl. 30. 1 precisely the
characteristic element is missing. For the same reason, he was not a Greek,
even though he had received (like St. Paul) an excellent Greek education.
He brings different attitudes to literature, as his preoccupation with the
ultimately religious term ekplexis shows. Yet he does not for all that
question Uie primacy or paradigmatic status of Greek literature. He was not
therefore a culniral partisan, like Philo or even Josephus in the first century.
He wrote at a time when traditional rhetorical ideas and even terminology
were open to radical modification. He was not however a vox clamantis in
deserto. He expected his readers to "need no reminder" {\vc\ koX Tiepixxov fi
Tipoq ei66i:a<; Sie^ievai). The recipient of the treatise was obviously not
meant to be puzzled by his redefinition of lojpioq. In Greek, the Umdeutung
may possibly be signalled by the time of Olympiodorus, even though the
Aristotelian meaning persisted in the Christian Bishop Eustathius (tll94?);
and in the Latin tradition the original sense of Horace's dominantia verba is
Isocrates had already described language as man's most distinguishing characteristic
(Antidosis 293-94). We cannot wholly separate the Greek and the non-Greek in ideas, any more
than we can do that in vocabulary.
^ Cf. OT Ps. 115:4 and. in the same tradition. ei6coXa acptova. NT 1 Ep. Cor. 12:2. The
golem, particularly associated wiih Rabbi Low in 16ih century Prague (his memory still persists
at ihe old Jewish Synagogue there), but known long before him. was also dumb. The clay
sparrows in The Infancy Story ofThomas, by contrast, "went away chirping" (Edgar Hennecke,
New Testament Apocrypha, ed. Wilhehn Schneemelcher. Volume I. Eng. tr. R. McL. Wilson
[Philadelphia 1963]. p. 393). and this of course is the point of an anecdote that appears to baffle
exegetes. Contrast the typically religious "amazement" that ensues in the apocryphal Gospel
narrative.
^ Op. cit., 1 10. citing Spengel Te%vTi 'PriTopiKTi
, p. 304 = p. 558 W.
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still preserved in the fifth century. An enquiry opens of wide compass, but
for the moment what it all suggests is that we should look for as late a date
for the de Sublimitate as is compatible with the other evidence, and for its
author in one of the schools of rhetoric scattered during the Empire around
the lands of the Middle East, though not too far from one land to be
unruffled, in spite of Greek sophistication, by ruakh elohimP
University ofIllinois at Urbana-Champaign
^'Cf. ckPoXti xo\> 6ainovio\) TtvevnaToc;, 33. 5.

